“This is Bibi’s War” - Harvard’s Graham Allison on the Influences and Endgame of the Iran War

Summary

Harvard Professor Graham Allison returns to the All-In Podcast for a sweeping strategic analysis of the most pressing geopolitical crises facing the world. Allison, the founding dean of the Harvard Kennedy School who has advised every Secretary of Defense since Kissinger, delivers a blunt assessment of the ongoing U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran: he calls it “Bibi’s war,” arguing that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has been obsessively pursuing the destruction of the Iranian regime for two decades and finally succeeded in drawing the Trump administration into the conflict. While praising the extraordinary military and intelligence capabilities on display, Allison warns that destroying a regime is far easier than building a stable replacement, citing the costly failures of Iraq and Afghanistan as cautionary precedents. He sees Trump as likely to declare victory soon — possibly before his scheduled China trip on March 29th — but notes that Netanyahu wants to fight on until the regime is fully destroyed.

The conversation then pivots to China, Taiwan, Greenland, and nuclear proliferation. On Taiwan, Allison puts the probability of a Chinese invasion at roughly 5% for the near term, citing China’s ongoing military leadership purge, its theory of “peaceful reunification,” and the fact that Trump is the most accommodating U.S. president China is likely to see on the Taiwan question. He introduces his powerful “80-80-9” framework: 80 years without a great power war, 80 years without a nuclear weapon used in combat, and only 9 nuclear-armed states — a record he describes as historically unprecedented and dangerously fragile. On Greenland, he argues the U.S. can get everything it needs through long-term leasing rather than acquisition, and characterizes Trump’s approach as part reality TV show, part strategic maneuvering.

The episode closes with a sobering discussion of domestic risk: rising wealth inequality in the United States. Allison warns that when the top 10-20% capture 70-80% of economic gains, the resulting resentment is “not stable and sustainable in a democracy,” creating fertile ground for radical populism and socialism. He urges those at the top to recognize they have the most to lose and to think more seriously about redistribution before the political system forces more extreme solutions.

Highlights

”This is Bibi’s War” — Netanyahu as Captain Ahab

“If your reader or if your listeners don’t remember Moby Dick, they should go look at it again. Ahab had this fixation, obsession with the white whale and tried to find a way to kill the white whale whenever he could. For the last two decades, that’s been Bibi’s number one, number two, number three agenda. He’s tried to sell that war to Obama, to Trump one, to Biden, and how he succeeded in mesmerizing Trump, who I thought had his number, I’m surprised.” — Graham Allison, 3:00

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”I see no evidence for that” — Allison dismantles war rationale

“I think that I understand he’s brilliant politically, but I don’t think this, the arguments that were made that Trump has actually repeated, that Iran was about to attack us, I see no evidence for that. That Iran was about to get a nuclear weapon, I see no evidence for that. That Iran was building an ICBM that was going to attack the US, I see no evidence for that.” — Graham Allison, 3:00

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Trump’s Taiwan “Sharpie” moment

“Somebody asks him about Taiwan, he picks up one of those Sharpies and goes bump, you know, a spot on the Resolute desk and he says, ‘That’s Taiwan,’ then he draws his hand around the whole desk, he said, ‘That’s China.’” — Graham Allison, 27:00

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The “80-80-9” framework for global security

“So these are three numbers, each of which is the answer to a question. And if you can remember the three numbers, and you can identify the question to which each one is the answer, you have the big picture about international security in the lifetime of yourself and even your parents, that’s virtually everybody who’s alive today.” — Graham Allison, 49:14

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Wealth inequality is “not stable and sustainable in a democracy”

“It’s just not stable in a democracy if everybody gets a vote and if the top 10 or 20 percent are taking 80 or 70 percent of the pie. That’s not stable and sustainable I think. And it’s a political invitation for a populist and demagogue — I mean you don’t even have to be a demagogue to say that’s not fair, that’s not reasonable.” — Graham Allison, 58:07

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Xiaomi built cars in three years after Apple spent $10 billion and failed

“Xiaomi, three years ago, decided they would make cars after watching Apple spend $10 billion not able to make a car. Within three years, that factory is producing cars right now. And they have a huge demand for these cars. They have three lines. One of the lines is all robots.” — Graham Allison, 37:19

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Key Points

• “This is Bibi’s war” (3:00) - Allison compares Netanyahu to Captain Ahab from Moby Dick, arguing he has pursued the destruction of Iran for two decades and finally convinced Trump to act
• Supreme military and intelligence demonstration (3:00) - The U.S. and Israeli operations have been “way, way, way off the charts,” a product of decades of investment
• No tears for Khamenei (3:00) - Allison says the Islamic Republic regime is evil and nothing bad that happens to them should be mourned
• Breaking vs building (3:00) - Historical precedent from Iraq and Afghanistan shows regime change rarely succeeds; the U.S. spent over a trillion dollars and thousands of lives in Afghanistan only for the Taliban to return to power
• No evidence for war rationale (3:00) - Allison disputes claims that Iran was about to attack the U.S., get a nuclear weapon, or build ICBMs capable of striking America
• Netanyahu vs Trump’s exit timeline (20:03) - Trump likely wants to declare victory before his March 29 China trip, but Netanyahu wants to fight on until the regime is fully destroyed
• Iran as paper tiger (16:32) - Allison gave the Defense Department a list of 11 things Iran could do in retaliation; they have done essentially none of them
• Taiwan invasion probability ~5% (25:14) - China is purging its military leadership, expects “peaceful reunification” via KMT election in January 2028, and has the most accommodating U.S. president on Taiwan
• Trump’s Sharpie moment on Taiwan (27:00) - Trump demonstrated his view of Taiwan vs China by making a dot on his desk (Taiwan) and sweeping his hand around the entire desk (China)
• China’s meteoric rise (33:44) - From less than a quarter of U.S. GDP in 2000 to 25% larger by purchasing power parity today; from 5% of global trade to 35%
• Robots replacing demographics problem (37:19) - More than half the factory worker robots in the world are in China; Xiaomi built a car factory in three years that Apple couldn’t do with $10 billion
• Greenland as reality TV (42:00) - Allison argues the U.S. can get everything it needs from Greenland through a 99-year lease; Trump’s invasion talk was partly for dramatic effect
• Alienating allies hurts China strategy (45:26) - In a rivalry with a country four times our population, alienating Canada and Europe is counterproductive; we need allies with “heft on our side of the seesaw”
• 80-80-9 framework (49:14) - 80 years without a great power war (longest since Rome), 80 years without nuclear weapons use, and only 9 nuclear states — all fragile and eroding
• North Korea as ticking bomb (54:34) - Kim Jong-un has over 100 nuclear warheads and missiles that can reach the American homeland; only 20-25 minutes longer flight time to Boston than from Iran
• Wealth inequality threatens democracy (57:36) - The top 10-20% taking 70-80% of economic gains is not sustainable when everyone gets a vote
• DSA mayors and rising socialism (56:22) - Self-declared socialists winning mayoral elections across the U.S. signals a dangerous populist trend
• People at the top have the most to lose (1:01:16) - Friedberg argues the wealthy should think more about generosity and redistribution before more radical solutions are imposed

Mentions

Companies

• Apple (37:19) - Spent $10 billion trying to make a car and failed, contrasted with Xiaomi’s success
• Xiaomi (37:19) - Chinese phone company that built a car factory in three years with robot-staffed production lines
• TSMC (30:06) - Produces 96% of advanced semiconductors; Taiwan’s strategic importance hinges on this
• Airwallex (0:52) - Ad sponsor, global financial platform

Products & Technologies

• 5G (34:38) - Cited as an area where China has surged ahead
• EVs (34:38) - China’s EV industry used as example of gladiatorial competition subsidized by the state
• Factory robots (37:19) - More than half the world’s factory worker robots are in China
• Patriot missile defense (15:00) - Patriots intended for Ukraine are now deployed in the Middle East
• Advanced semiconductors (30:06) - 96% come from Taiwan; Scott Bessent calls this the biggest threat he’s ever seen
• Nuclear weapons (49:47) - Only 9 states have them; 90-95 could build them in a year or two

People

• Graham Allison (0:00) - Harvard Kennedy School founding dean, guest for this episode
• Benjamin Netanyahu / Bibi (3:00) - Israeli PM; Allison calls the Iran war “Bibi’s war” and compares him to Ahab
• Donald Trump (2:03) - President who authorized the Iran attack; described as erratic but with political coordinates
• Khamenei (1:22) - Supreme Leader of Iran, killed in the attack
• Bill O’Reilly (6:33) - Former student of Allison; described as one of the better “Trumpologists”
• Condoleezza Rice (12:19) - Former Secretary of State; recently at the White House advising the President on Iran
• Clausewitz (2:03) - Referenced for “fog of war” concept
• Xi Jinping (27:00) - Chinese president; conducting deep purge of military leadership
• Scott Bessent (30:06) - Secretary of the Treasury; calls TSMC semiconductor concentration the biggest threat he’s seen
• Jensen Huang (39:00) - NVIDIA CEO who said visiting China felt like visiting the future
• Mark Carney (45:26) - Canadian PM; described as “as American as anybody” from his Harvard days
• John F. Kennedy (51:18) - In 1963 predicted 25-30 nuclear weapon states by the 1970s
• Kim Jong-un (54:34) - Has over 100 nuclear warheads and missiles capable of reaching the U.S. homeland
• A.Q. Khan (52:44) - Pakistani nuclear scientist who tried to proliferate nuclear technology
• Anthony Scaramucci / “Mooch” (47:34) - Former Trump communications director who predicted the Greenland drama at Davos
• Elon Musk (37:19) - Referenced saying there will be more robots than people; worries about Chinese robot companies

Surprising Quotes

“I was at the Defense Department and I gave them a list of 11 things that I would do and be capable of doing if I were playing the Iranian hand and they seem to be… I mean I don’t even want to say out loud, but they act like a paper tiger.” — Graham Allison, 15:47

“Somebody asks him about Taiwan, he picks up one of those Sharpies and goes bump, you know, a spot on the Resolute desk and he says, ‘That’s Taiwan,’ then he draws his hand around the whole desk, he said, ‘That’s China.’” — Graham Allison, 27:00

“If you had gone… if there had been prediction markets and you’d gone in 1945 or 50, you would have got 10,000 to 1 odds against that. It’s impossible. The weapon that ended World War II and you’re not ever going to see any use of those weapons in war? Whoa.” — Graham Allison, 50:49

“Nuclear weapons are either good for North Korea and South Korea, or they’re good for neither of them. Your choice.” — Graham Allison, 54:34

“Getting Canadians to think of us as an enemy is a pretty wild idea… if you go and threaten a politician’s survival, that’s a pretty good way to piss them off. And if you threaten to take territory from people, that’s a pretty good way to make them feel hostile.” — Graham Allison, 45:26

Transcript

Jason Calacanis: 0:00 Welcome to another episode of the All-In Interview. I’m really excited to be joined by, back to All-In, Harvard professor Graham Allison. Professor Allison, welcome back to All-In.

Graham Allison: 0:10 Thanks for having me.

Jason Calacanis: 0:11 We last had you at the summit in Los Angeles, so it’s great to have a conversation. A lot’s happened since we last got together. For the audience, Graham Allison’s the founding dean of the Harvard Kennedy School. He’s advised every Secretary of Defense since Kissinger. He’s helped dismantle 12,000 Soviet nuclear weapons, and his book Destined for War remains the definitive framework for understanding the U.S.-China relationship. I think it’s worth kind of bringing forward some of the things that have happened in the world since we last met.

Jason Calacanis: 1:22 Let’s start with Iran. The U.S. and Israel are in the middle of an attack on Iran and the supreme leader is dead, but the regime is still holding on to power. Where do you think this conflict will take us and are we sleepwalking into World War III?

Graham Allison: 1:32 Well, thank you again for having me back. I think you have a great podcast. I enjoyed the summit and I’m sorry we’re not there in person to catch up. But I think about Iran, how much to say… so this could be a long lecture. Let me just do four or five quick points. First point, most important point, is that there’s more questions than answers. So there’s a huge level of uncertainty currently about what’s happening and about what’s likely to happen.

Graham Allison: 2:03 Part of this is Clausewitz’s famous fog of war, but it’s a fog of war that’s actually been increased because we got two big fog machines, adding to the confusion, namely Trump and the administration on the one hand and Bibi on the other. And then we got all the chattering class around us. So I would say, why did Trump decide to go to war now? There’s six different reasons he and the administration have given and each one they back out. What’s the objective? There’s five different objectives, back it around. And when is this war going to end? You know, a day, a week, a month, who knows? So it’s very uncomfortable to recognize how uncertain things are and most of the conversation about it tries to make it more confident. But I think the place to start is there’s a huge amount of uncertainty. Having said that, I’ll still give you my prejudices about a few…

Graham Allison: 3:00 The voice. Point two, this has been an extraordinary demonstration of supreme military power and supreme intelligence power. US military and the intelligence community and the Israeli counterparts have been way, way, way off the charts. And I think this should make all Americans proud of what’s been built over this decade of two decades of investment, but especially the past decade. A third point, there’s no tears to be shed for Khamenei and this Islamic Republic regime. It’s an evil leader, an evil regime. There’s no bad thing that could happen to them that we shouldn’t be cheering all of that. Next point, though, breaking something’s a lot easier than building something. And destroying targets is something that our military knows very well how to do. Building a new regime, regime change is something that we know historically doesn’t work very well. At least in Iraq and Afghanistan, we had every word said that’s been said in this case. And we then went in whole in and spent more than a trillion dollars, of many, many thousands of American lives. And when we went to Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling. When we left Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling. So I would say, unfortunately, it’s against a backdrop that’s hard. And next point, slightly more controversial, but I think this is Bibi’s war. If your reader or if your listeners don’t remember Moby Dick, they should go look at it again. Ahab had this fixation, obsession with the white whale and tried to find a way to kill the white whale whenever he could. For the last two decades, that’s been Bibi’s number one, number two, number three agenda. He’s tried to sell that war to Obama, to Trump one, to Biden, and how he succeeded in mesmerizing Trump, who I thought had his number, I’m surprised. So I’m pro-Israel, but anti-Bibi in this respect. And I think that I understand he’s brilliant politically, but I don’t think this, the arguments that were made that Trump has actually repeated, that Iran was about to attack us, I see no evidence for that. That Iran was about to get a nuclear weapon, I see no evidence for that. That Iran was building an ICBM that was going to attack the US, I see no evidence for that. There’s many, many bad things about the Iranian regime, but not most of the claims that were made. So I look at this and I hope it turns out well, but I remember that in wars very frequently it’s easy to get in and it’s quite difficult to get out.

Jason Calacanis: 5:57 Let me double click on that point. You mentioned the multiple reasons the administration has messaged for doing this, multiple views on what success looks like, multiple timelines on ending it, and that this is BB’s war. How do you think Trump was motivated to do this? What is the real motivation? And I will ask this in the context of the big delegation and visit to China coming up next month. Is Trump motivated fundamentally to create leverage with China and use this as a tool to try and maximize his negotiating leverage going into the Chinese negotiation?

Graham Allison: 6:33 That’s a great question, and I wish that the answer was this was all part of a grand strategy. That would make me feel a hugely bit better. But I try to do Trumpology, and I was actually having dinner last night with Bill O’Reilly, a former student, who I think is one of the better Trumpologists or trying to interpret, and we were going back and forth through this. It’s easy enough to see why the window, tactically, the window in which this attack occurred was chosen because here you got 40, you got the supreme leader and 40 of the other leaders of Iran out in public. So that’s an opportunity as a target, the best opportunity that’s come along. The question is why would you be attacking them? And especially Trump, given his campaign and his previous views about not repeating the mistakes of the people that took us into endless, windless wars. And I think it’s, I mean I think BB is a magician. I think his single-mindedness is impressive. I think his agility in making arguments and developing arguments is impressive. How he managed to persuade Trump this was a good idea for the US now, I don’t have a good idea. And I think that, I think if I listen to the reasons why even the people closest surrounding him have given, or that Trump have given, they don’t seem persuasive. Now partly Trump is erratic, partly he sort of, you know, acts on the basis of instincts. Somehow it came to him that this was, you know, something that could be done. I think actually BB painted a pretty, I mean the upside of this picture, if it’s successful, and I hope now that we’ve gone into it, it would be, would be redefining security in the Middle East for a generation. So getting rid of the Iranian regime as the BB and company have gotten rid of the proxies of the regime earlier, which again since October 7th has been extremely impressive, could possibly, you could say well there’s going to be a whole new Middle East, and if the Middle East were all like the UAE, that would be fantastic, fantastic for all the human beings that lived there. So I think maybe he got excited by the upside, not quite careful enough about the risks or the downside because the number of ways in which this could go wrong, you know, if we woke up tomorrow or today and a couple of ships had been sunk or a couple of hundred Americans had been killed, this is going to have a very different, a different image.

Jason Calacanis: 9:24 And do you think that this is independent then of the action with Maduro and independent of the big delegation headed to China for big negotiation next month?

Graham Allison: 9:37 Well, I wouldn’t say entirely independent. I would think with Maduro, so Trump, I think, this again, this is my whatever, armchair trumpology, but I would say initially he thought tariffs were a magic wand. And every leader thinks if you have a magic wand, that’s fantastic. He’s tried the tariff magic wand and discovered it didn’t quite have all the effects that he imagined on liberation day. He then discovered the American military, which genuinely is a huge wand, and the Maduro operation was just spectacular. I mean, again, as a military and intelligence operation, brilliant. No other country in the world could even imagine doing something like that. And that actually, you know, makes all of us stand taller. It can also provide a little or historically encourages hubris and an imagination that this magic wand can work in many other arenas. I don’t mind at all the proposition that every other country should take account of the fact that the US has the most remarkable military and intelligence community in the world. And that’s not a bad backdrop for China and for a China trip. So I agree that things may not be completely disconnected. But I think in terms of the timing, I mean, right now, when is the war going to be over? If you talk about three or four weeks, where will already… he’ll be in China March 29th. So my inclination, again, if we were just doing prediction markets, is that he’s going to find a way to declare this over before then because he needs a little time to get his mind set on that. But if you ask the folks at the Defense Department or if you ask the people in Israel, they think this is another month or beyond as a war. So again, things I don’t think are quite, you know, in sync.

Jason Calacanis: 11:37 Jason’s joined us. Professor Allison, it’s always a treat to have you. Nice to see you. Nice to see you. It’s just amazing to have you on here and to give us this time.

Chamath Palihapitiya: 11:46 If things were to go extremely well and Iran went from a monarchy to a dictatorship and now in this third act here in the modern day to a democracy and you actually had a democracy with 93…

Jason Calacanis: 12:00 80 million citizens in the Middle East, what impact would that have on the region? We’ve seen the Gulf monarchies evolve human rights, but they’re still monarchies. You have one other, I guess, democracy in the region in Israel, but this could be extraordinary if it was a democracy. What would that mean to the global chessboard?

Graham Allison: 12:19 Well, it’s a good question. I mean, if this could occur, it would be spectacular. Even, I think, but I would say this is way, way, way too ambitious. There’s a hundred things that would be wonderful outcomes better than what’s likely that would be short of that. I remember in Iraq after Bush failed to find nuclear weapons, which was the initial, I would say, somewhat cooked-up rationale for our going into Iraq, Condoleezza Rice, who was the Secretary, gave a speech about how wonderful it’ll be when Iraq is a democracy and market economy, quote, ‘radiating stability through the Middle East.’ So we’re pretty good at doing ‘I have a dream,’ you know, in that version. I think that’s a way, way, way stretch. I would be very happy with a regime there that simply was not about building nuclear weapons, was not about building missiles that threaten the US and our friends and allies in the region, and not about supporting proxies. And if it’s a pretty cruel regime, unfortunately, that’s unfortunate for the Iranian people. The Persian people, I mean, I’m a student of history. I love Persia. You know, I remember Cyrus, and I remember the Peloponnesian War. I remember, you know, this is a fantastic culture and history. They’ve been hijacked by a terrible, terrible group of people. And if those people can be somehow ousted, you know, wonderful for the Iranian people and wonderful for the world.

Graham Allison: 13:32 If I were betting it, again, I’d say go back to the first point. The question’s uncertainty, finding signals in the noise, extremely difficult. But if I were betting it, it’ll end up that the guys with the guns will, in some version, be the next iteration. And if they’re tamer and less determined to threaten our interests…

David Friedberg: 14:30 Will this have been worth it? Well, again, we’ll have to look at, you know, over the longer run. I think the other thing that we know about wars is that they’re unpredictable and that they have many unanticipated consequences. So I think as we watch what’s happening now and see what impact does that have on oil and gas prices? Predictable. So you can see and going and going. Well, what impact does that have on other countries?

Graham Allison: 15:00 Huge. So the number of countries now whose economies are being disrupted by this impact and therefore blaming us for it. So I had a call from someone in Taiwan yesterday saying, wait a minute, did anybody think what this is doing for us since they get about half of their electricity from their natural gas that is now, you know, now not coming? If you ask about what this is meaning for Ukraine, all the Patriots that were to hope to prevent missile strikes from Russia on Ukraine are now in the Middle East.

Graham Allison: 15:47 So that’s that many more target. So it just unfortunately unfolds in so many different directions. Now I don’t want to seem too pessimistic about it because again, I think we’ve been shocked fortunately on the upside by how professional our military has and intelligence folks have been, and also how pathetic or hollow the Iranians have been. First day of the attack I was at the Defense Department and I gave them a list of 11 things that I would do and be capable of doing if I were playing the Iranian hand and they seem to be… I mean I don’t even want to say out loud, but they act like a paper tiger.

Jason Calacanis: 16:36 Do you think there’s more damage that can be done by being more successful? You know, if we think back to Iraq, Iran is twice as many people, 100 million versus 50 million, four times the land area, a much better equipped military and arguably the military system, the regime is embedded in every aspect of industry. So the more successful the United States is in dismantling the Iranian regime, and as was advised by Condoleezza Rice who apparently was just in the White House today and advising the President and publicly stated it’s time to finish them off, it’s time to go all the way, etc. Does that not then leave a country with no infrastructure, no leadership, 100 million people in tatters? And that’s the classic breeding ground for some of these extremist groups to seize control and seize power? And we don’t have the resources to go in and have another multi-decade Afghanistan Iraq problem.

Graham Allison: 17:40 I’m afraid I agree, yes. I think the uncertainties about that, I mean you can do four or five different scenarios for how this might conceivably end. It could end up being an extended civil war in Iran among the various national groups, even some of them possibly seceding. So again fairly chaotic. Look like Syria plus, okay. It could look like Iraq or Afghanistan.

David Sacks: 18:07 Well excuse me, we were there for more than a decade with unlimited resources, hardly any constraints on the number of people and how’d that work out?

Graham Allison: 18:17 So I say that I’m a small C conservative and kind of think history is not always, it’s certainly not the only guide, but is a good place to start. I would say nervous, yeah.

Jason Calacanis: 18:32 Is it too late to have a Venezuelan outcome where we’ve taken out the head of the snake and we’ve simply replaced it? The snake can continue operating and living without too much destructive damage and effect, but it seems like we may be a little too far gone now in Iran and that to take this all the way might be very difficult to manage. Is it too late?

Graham Allison: 18:53 Alright, if I were again, we’re all in the dark and all the uncertainty, so back to point one, but after that I would say Trump is erratic, impulsive, but he has some coordinates and one of them is his power, right? November 3rd is a big day for him. He’s focused on that. The economy is a crucial element of that. That’s part of the framing of the China relationship. The impact of this on the economy is already evident, and could become more evident.

Graham Allison: 19:29 Public opinion. Again, I think he’s, I saw today in the journal that he’s sent Hicks-Smith out to sell the war? Good luck. I’m not sure he can sell, so the public opinion of this is about 6 to 4 unfavorable because he didn’t make the case for the war in advance.

Graham Allison: 19:53 The impact of this on other parties including parties that we care about is negative.

Graham Allison: 20:03 So I can easily imagine in the next week even him to declare victory at having, as you say, cut off the head of the snake, destroyed their military, their nuclear capability, destroyed their ability to project power or in the defense department we always say destroy or degrade. Degrade has a lot of dimensions as you would point out. And now it’s up to the Iranian people to seize their own government and take advantage of themselves. The difficulty with that will be Bibi wants to fight on until the regime is destroyed and that’ll be an interesting struggle to see how that goes. Earlier Trump demonstrated that when he thought it was in American interests he was prepared to pull Bibi’s chain. So…

Jason Calacanis: 21:01 This is, I think, before we move out of the MENA region, a topic that’s coming up. There’s obviously no support for this war in America. Most Americans put foreign affairs today at 1 or 2% of their concern. Economy and many other issues are high on their list. And he’s been pretty clear, ‘Hey, we’re not going to put boots on the ground.’ And then there’s this anti-semitic underpinning that’s happening in America that’s become pretty acute. And you had Rubio, who we mentioned earlier, say, ‘Hey, we did this because the Israelis were going in anyway and we had no choice.’ And then they walked that back. Explain to the audience how we should look at that turn of events, where there’s a group of people in America, specifically people in the MAGA party, who believe Trump has betrayed them and that he’s captured by the Israeli government in some way and he’s doing their bidding. I’m not saying that’s my perspective, but that is an undertone that we’re seeing. And that’s something new in our lifetime, I think.

Graham Allison: 22:07 It certainly is. So this is a big topic, but I’d say when I talk about it, I say I’m pro-Israeli and anti-Bibi. So Bibi is not Israel. The people whom I know most and respect most in Israel are the national security barons, the people who’ve been the chief of staff or the head of Mossad or the head of Shin Bet, or the people that work in those structures. And they believe that Bibi is actually destroying the Ben-Gurion’s Israeli democracy that they cared about. Or take Tom Friedman. It’s pretty hard to accuse him of being anti-semitic, but he’s been, I think, very clear and very courageous in pointing out that what Bibi’s doing to Israel’s democracy is really destroying it. And the impact of that on Jewish kids in America. I mean, I see this on campus, where they want to be proud of Israel. They deserve to be proud of the country that has been built over these years. But they look at the behavior of these crazy right-wing settlers and their activities in the occupied West Bank, or they look at some of the activities in Gaza, or they look at now the kind of unlimited war without any even attempt to make arguments about proportionality and just say, ‘Wait a minute, that’s not the country I want to be proud of. I want to be proud of Rabin’s Israel. I want to be proud of Ehud Barak’s Israel. I want to be proud of Ben-Gurion’s Israel.’ And I’m pretty much of that persuasion. I think what Bibi risks in this and risks to earlier, with siding… I mean, interfering in American politics invites pushback. So, I think this could have a big long-term negative effect both in the Democratic party and the Republican party, but especially among younger people. If you look at the polling for the under-30s on Israel, it’s just like shocking.

Jason Calacanis: 24:26 Yeah. Hmm. Can we move to China? Because I think that, again, this is going to be the big story over the next month. You’ve said publicly that ousting Maduro from Venezuela could embolden China to accelerate a Taiwan takeover. The CIA, it has been reported in media, warned Tim Cook of Apple and other tech companies about a possible invasion as soon as next year. You’ve separately met publicly with Chinese officials. What’s your view on the likelihood and the timeline of a China attempted takeover of Taiwan, and what are these kind of motivating factors that might make that happen sooner?

Graham Allison: 25:14 So, let me clarify. I’m not sure, or I may have been misinterpreted, but obviously the Chinese watch very carefully. They study wars, and they will learn lessons from what’s going on here. But I don’t think that is the… I don’t think the Venezuelan operation, other than making them feel envious about the capabilities, will impact their likelihood of attacking Taiwan. So, Taiwan. Number one, I think the likelihood of an attack on Taiwan this year or next year or even into ‘28 — but let me just do ‘26 and ‘27 — absent some major provocation by Taiwan or some other third incident, is very low. I’d put it at about where the prediction markets are, 5% or something, low. So, I’m not counting on it. Second…

Jason Calacanis: 26:02 Why is that so low? I’m just curious.

Graham Allison: 26:05 Okay, because first, they have a theory of the case of what they call peaceful reunification, and they think things are evolving in that direction. That theory of the case is that the current government, which is a DPP government, currently is stymied by its opposition in the parliament, so they can’t even buy the arm sales that we previously gave them. There’s $11 billion arm sales that the Chinese have complained about, but Taiwan — the legislature — probably won’t buy half of that. So, the current president is struggling. There’s going to be an election in January ‘28, and they think it’s likely that the former party, the KMT, will be elected. Somebody that they’ll be much more sympathetic to China and an evolving relationship. So that’s number one. Number two, the Chinese have been engaged in a deep, deep purge of all of their military leadership. I mean, it’s hard to believe, if you read about it in the paper from time to time that he fired this guy, he fired this guy. He’s fired the equivalent of every four-star in our whole political system and every combatant commander and every commander who would be commanding the forces to deal with Taiwan. So while they’ve been building up that military capability, it takes a long time to get that back into order in my view. So I would say that part makes me feel less likely. Third, I think he understands that if he were to do this, there’s a risk, not a certainty, but a risk that the US would become involved and that the impact of that either on China’s economy, which he’s got to worry about first, and also on its evolution, would be significant. So I’m looking for — and finally, in Trump, he has the most accommodating president that China’s likely to see with respect to Taiwan. So Trump has made no secrets, I mean he talks publicly of his views about Taiwan. In, I think, a couple of the memoirs, there’s this discussion where he’s in the Oval and he’s talking about Taiwan and he picked up one of those Sharpies and goes bump, you know, a spot on the Resolute desk and he says, ‘That’s Taiwan,’ then he draws his hand around the whole desk, he said, ‘That’s China.’ Haha. So I’d say, I’m less worried about Taiwan on the current path. Now over the longer run, the Chinese are absolutely clear, Xi and all the leadership, that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and how that could be satisfied in a way that allow the Taiwanese the degree or substantial degree of freedom for both their economy and their society is the challenge that we’ve been struggling with for a long time, but the good news is we’ve been doing this for 50 years and Taiwan has never seen such circumstances. So I say to the Taiwanese friends, you know, basically don’t screw it up.

Jason Calacanis: 29:37 Are we taking the right course of action, do you think? I guess the big question for you is what’s the strategic imperative to keep Taiwan from falling under direct Chinese control for the United States, and are we taking the right actions to hedge our bets if you will, against that happening? Meaning onshoring of semiconductor manufacturing, but also maybe…

David Friedberg: 30:00 From a defense perspective and positioning perspective, you can share a little bit about whether we’re on the right track.

Graham Allison: 30:06 Sure. That’s a big question. So first, Scott Bessent, the Secretary of the Treasury, when he’s asked about this, he says the biggest threat that he’s ever seen is the fact that 96% of the advanced semiconductors come from one small island that could be cut off. So TSMC, as you all have discussed before, produces the advanced semiconductors for essentially everybody, of whom we’re the principal consumer, and we prevent them shipping this to China. So that’s a pretty complicated situation to begin with. But secondly, Taiwan is halfway around the world, as President Trump says, and 90 miles off the shore of China, and we’re far away and we have a lot of other things to worry about. So it’s a little bit like Cuba, so inherently indefensible if China were seriously determined to either destroy it or to take it.

Graham Allison: 31:06 Now, on the other hand, since the opening to China and the Shanghai Communique, there’s been an agreement of maintaining a status quo, with the US commitment being what’s called strategic ambiguity, in which the US and China have been committed to Taiwan. Internal development is left to its own device, and China doesn’t use military force to prevent that, but we say Taiwan, there’s one China, and the only China’s capital is Beijing, and then we have a little bit of an ambiguous way to talk about the relationship between Taiwan and China, but certainly letting it evolve in any way that the parties would be prepared to live with. Most people expecting that over time this relationship will work its way out. And when I talk to Chinese about it, I say to them, first, you’ve never seen 50 better years on either side of the straits. So this has been fantastic for both societies in terms of what they care about. And secondly, if they look at this situation, if China’s core strategy is correct, which is the inexorable rise of China, and that continues in another decade or two, Taiwan will look like a flea, okay? And therefore not going to be an issue. If China’s main narrative doesn’t work, Taiwan is not going to be their biggest problem. So they should work on the other issues, yeah.

David Friedberg: 32:45 If you think about China projecting influence around the world, how important is it for them to continue to do that? There was recently an objective, I think, of a GDP growth in the 5% range, 4 to 5%? Is that right for China, which 4.5 to 5, yeah. 4.5 to 5, which is a record low in recent history for them.

Jason Calacanis: 33:07 Is it imperative for China to continue to extend geopolitical and economic influence around the world to grow its economy? You know, going back to the framing of the rising power, do they still need to do that to keep people happy at home? Or is China going to be able to maintain happiness at home in a multipolar world where China and perhaps the US and perhaps some other countries share influence around the world?

Graham Allison: 33:38 This is one you’ve raised and we talked about last time, which is interesting. I think we agreed, so let me just again for people that don’t remember, start. So first, China is a meteoric rising power. Never has a country risen so far so fast on so many different dimensions. If you take a snapshot of the year 2000 and the year 2025 and compare China on any metric of power, it’s just dumbfounding. So country that I have compared it to kind of like a Formula One racing. A country that we couldn’t find in our rearview mirror in 2000, because it was so far behind, we have trouble finding in our rearview mirror today because it’s beside us or in many races even slightly ahead of us. So that’s GDP, it was less than a quarter the US in 2000. Today by purchase power parity, it’s 25% larger. In 2000, trading it was 5% of global and we were 15, today it’s 35 and we’re 25. If you do advanced tech in any arena, take 5G… oh my goodness, take EVs… oh my goodness, take whatever, okay, so rapidly rising power. That’s essential, that’s the infrastructure for their grand narrative, which is the inexorable rise of China to its natural position in the international order, which they think is at the top of the pyramid. So they are absolutely determined to be number one in their own arena to begin with and then after that, you know, maybe more. And they also have a second proposition: the inexorable decline of the US. And they look at the various parts of the US and the components including getting involved in unnecessary wars as part of that story, as part of their narrative. And that dynamic, the shifting of the seesaw, is what gives you this Thucydidean dynamic that we discussed before, which most often, hard as it is to believe, but most often discombobulates people so much that then some incident or accident, like something that happens over Taiwan, leads to a vicious circle of actions and reactions that drags them into a war after which they think, ‘My God, how did this ever happen?’ So that’s a long story, but I would say the economic piece is essential for this. And that economic piece means they want to be the manufacturing workshop for the world, and the foundry for the world, and the supplier for the world.

Jason Calacanis: 36:37 There are two major challenges they have, I believe. One of them is population decline, the other is unemployment. And the AI that we’ve seen and what’s hitting first could hit them in a major way. Manufacturing is moving to robotics at an alarming pace. Then you have things like self-driving, which is a major job there for many people. So on those two axes, when you see the youth unemployment, which I think is 15 or 20% in some locations in China, and the population decline, is that Xi’s two big challenges to deal with? And how does that affect this relationship?

Graham Allison: 37:19 Good question. And this is more in y’all’s space than mine, because I’ve tried to follow, but Elon says there’s going to be more robots than people. Okay. And if you ask him, ‘Where are the most advanced robots in the world? The ones that are kicking his ass, or that he worries about?’ They’re China. So they’ve got a huge number of robot companies. When I was there in last — when was I last there? In January. I went to see a factory, the Xiaomi, the phone company. And Xiaomi, three years ago, decided they would make cars after watching Apple spend $10 billion not able to make a car. Within three years, that factory is producing cars right now. And they have a huge demand for these cars. They have three lines. One of the lines is all robots. Okay? So they’re putting a lot of robots to work. More than half of the working — the factory worker robots in the world are in China. And so some of the people are saying, ‘Well, you know, demographics isn’t going to be so big a problem because if demographics is only a problem because of workers, we’re going to have — in fact, the American workers are more worried about, you know, taking our jobs.’ So that’s a — Now, the issue of for the impact on education, they have a number of people that have been educated in arenas that are now no longer, you know, high-demand jobs. Unfortunately, we have a lot of that, too. I mean, if you look at people, college graduates now graduated in I don’t know DEI subjects they’re having trouble getting jobs so I would say it’s a little — there’s more similarities there than differences. The other thing is Chinese have demonstrated a much greater capacity of readiness to adopt and adapt to new technologies. So if you look at the — I’m sure you have or y’all have probably had him on Jensen Huang but when he went to China he said gee I think I came to the future. You know the people don’t, you know, they don’t use — not only do they not use coins they don’t use bills they don’t use checks they don’t use credit cards they just have their face as they go through the store.

Jason Calacanis: 39:50 Let’s shift around to what some have described as the longer term playing field which is near the Arctic. Some have argued that much of the recent push for Greenland by the United States is driven by the military threat coming over the Arctic from Russia and from China. I’m wondering if you could just help frame for our audience why is Greenland so strategic to the United States and is this effectively a proxy for defense against China and Russia and why now?

David Sacks: 40:27 Another big question. So let me start with the bottom line I think that at least from the judgments of the people whom I respect the most we can — we the US can get everything we want from Greenland without invading it or owning it. So Greenland has been an important base for missile defenses the Thule base we had two other bases that we closed but we can open as many other bases as we want and they’re very amenable to that. I think President Trump’s right to say well yeah but I don’t want a short-term lease on these bases so I would say a 99-year lease sounds like a pretty good lease to me for in 99 years God knows what’s going to be happening but to the extent that missile defense is part of it which it is I would say that’s a part for the naval component yes I think as the Arctic melts you already now have an opening of sea lanes and the way that the territorial ownership the abutters have their claim to the local and the regional and there the main claims are Russian and Canadian we have a chunk from Alaska and then Greenland would be a piece of that so I would say that’s relevant but those sea lanes at least for the navy people I talk to are…

Graham Allison: 42:00 They’re not as important as they used to be because now there’s so many different ways to get it. You’re not going to try to blockade a waterway with ships. You’re going to do it with smart mines or you’re going to do it simply by attacking the ships on the way. And if it’s underwater, underwater’s pretty much all the same. I mean it’s good to have narrow places and shallow places for looking for things, but, so I would say, I think Trump’s Greenland venture was more like for fun. Plus, I mean, I think one of the people that knows him well says remember he’s first of all a reality TV producer and star. So he just has fun starting with a drama, getting people very excited, letting the tension rise, and then finding a resolution. And I think we’re on track to a resolution there.

Jason Calacanis: 43:04 Let me push back just on that point. What I have heard is that there’s rising socialism in Western Europe, growing concern that over time as socialism becomes more of the mainstay in the governing models in Western European nations, those nations fall more under the influence of China. And as a result, if you think about the influence that China could then have on Denmark and on Danish foreign policy, if the United States doesn’t secure what it needs for the long term, and it may not know what it needs for the long term physically in Greenland today, we only know what we need today, that we’re at risk of China having outsized influence over Greenland tomorrow. And that that’s the real reason for the big push today for Greenland. How does that sit with you and does that align kind of with what some folks are concerned about?

Graham Allison: 43:58 I have to think about it. I hadn’t heard that argument just that way. Again, what is socialism? It’s complicated. Certainly the Chinese, well yes, they’re socialists in some respect. I would say capitalism is, I mean, they’re autocratic and they’re party led, but then their economy is essentially fiercely capitalist. I mean you have what one of my friends calls gladiatorial conflict that makes the competition in Silicon Valley look tame as the parties fight each other.

David Sacks: 44:40 Well because you can’t make money because the taxes are so high, but that’s another, that’s another…

Graham Allison: 44:44 Well, and in their case, you know, they start, they decide they’re going into an arena, let’s say for example EVs, and so they give advantages to companies getting started, even subsidies, and then they let them fight it out.

David Friedberg: 45:00 And lo and behold at the end there’ll be, you know, ten or five, but it’s fiercely competitive in the meantime. And a lot of guys will get trampled along the way. And then those guys are excess capacity and they’ll sell things off, you know, without any concern about the CapEx. They’re just as long as they can stay ahead of the game, you know, selling items or even selling out their inventory.

Graham Allison: 45:26 I think watching the way, watching the evolution of other countries including Europe and their relations with China as well as with us in this game is a very relevant point. And I would say that one of the things that the Trump administration has had trouble with is recognizing that if we’re in a fierce rivalry with China, they’ve got four times as many people, we need to have some allies with heft on our side of the seesaw to keep it from going the wrong direction. And so, yes, you kind of sometimes need to give your ally a cold bath in order to get them to shape up. But getting Canadians to think of us as an enemy is a pretty wild idea. I mean, any treatment that comes to that conclusion — and if you take Carney whom I know from once he was a Harvard College kid — he’s as American as anybody, or he was. But the idea if you go and threaten a politician’s survival, that’s a pretty good way to piss them off. And if you threaten to take territory from people, that’s a pretty good way to make them feel hostile. So this is an unusual treatment if we’re trying to, you know, get guys with heft on our side of the seesaw.

Jason Calacanis: 47:04 At the World Economic Forum — I wasn’t sure if it was Davos or another of their forums — were you at the Davos one this year?

Graham Allison: 47:14 Sure.

Jason Calacanis: 47:15 So as a total aside, just bringing President Trump’s impact, it was two and a half days of people wondering what he would say when he got there. The town shut down as people watched his two-hour stand-up, you know, delivery, and then another two days of people sort of trying to understand and figure out what happened there. So there’s something —

Graham Allison: 47:30 It was a reality TV show for sure.

Jason Calacanis: 47:32 Yeah, he took over the whole floor, yeah.

Graham Allison: 47:34 So I mean actually this fellow, Mooch, who was his communication guy for a week or 10 days until he got fired in the first administration, said on the first night I was at an event, he said, ‘Remember, this is going to be a reality TV show. It’s going to start with the claim that we’re going to invade Greenland.’ Which, by god, invading an ally, that’s a pretty big deal. He said, ‘Then you’re going to watch the drama —’

David Sacks: 48:00 When Trump had a chance to speak, he’s speaking this long range back and forth, back and forth, but he did have a just a paragraph in which he said, he basically took the gun off the table. But before that, he was doing a Mafioso act. Even some Mafioso lines about, you know, you could either have it the easy way or the hard way, one of the… that’s a Godfather line. And so people were saying, yikes, you know, what has been loosed on us? So now you have all this drama, but then he says, I’ve decided we’re not going to invade Greenland. You know, he just passes that off. So now the temperature goes down. And now the third day, he does some other institute or board of peace and he says, we now have a framework of an agreement. So I think half the time he’s having fun.

Jason Calacanis: 48:54 You know, it sort of… it does get people’s attention.

Jason Calacanis: 48:58 You um… on a substantive basis shared a framework: 80, 80, 9. And I think it was, you know, I’ve spent a bunch of time listening to the talk you gave and some people’s reaction to it. Maybe you could share it with the audience and why it’s important.

Graham Allison: 49:14 Oh, thank you, I’m glad you… so I think this is a big idea. So these are three numbers, each of which is the answer to a question. And if you can remember the three numbers, and you can identify the question to which each one is the answer, you have the big picture about international security in the lifetime of yourself and even your parents, that’s virtually everybody who’s alive today. So the first 80 is the answer to what?

Jason Calacanis: 49:45 How long it’s been since a World War?

Graham Allison: 49:47 How many years since a Great Power War? Since a World War? Now, whoa, wait a minute, 80 years? This is the longest peace in recorded history since Rome. This is not natural. This is very abnormal. This didn’t happen by accident. This was what the people who founded the international order after World War II were trying to build: a New World Order. Because they had just lived through a terrible World War II simply one generation before. They remembered, hey, there was World War I. So if we just keep doing this, we should expect World War III. It should’ve already happened. It could’ve happened at the Cuban Missile Crisis. So: no Great Power War. Fantastic. But a fragile, a work in progress all the time, eroding inevitably for many, many different reasons. Okay, second 80.

Jason Calacanis: 50:46 How many years since we’ve had a nuclear bomb go off?

Graham Allison: 50:49 Fantastic. So think about that. If you had gone… if there had been prediction markets and you’d gone in 1945 or 50, you would have got 10,000 to 1 odds against that. It’s impossible. The weapon that ended World War II and you’re not ever going to see any use of those weapons in war? Whoa.

Jason Calacanis: 51:11 And then nine, the number of countries, nation states that have nuclear bombs today.

Graham Allison: 51:18 Fantastic, Jackie, you’re right. Now how in the world could you have only nine countries having nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons being your kind of ultimate security blanket. Again, John Kennedy in 1963 said, by the ’70s there’ll be 25 or 30 nuclear weapon states. Because he thought that as states acquired the capability to build nuclear weapons, they would do so. Today, 90, 95 states could have nuclear weapons in a year or two if they decided to build them. Actually, into the ’70s, Sweden had a serious nuclear program, South Korea had a nuclear program, Taiwan had a nuclear program. US closed those down, created a so-called non-proliferation regime that’s accounted for this nine. But I would say, again, fragile, eroding, not likely to be sustained. So when I try to do my giving thanks for things that I should be thankful for, thankful for 80 years without a great power war. If there were a great power war, you and I, we wouldn’t be here, and we wouldn’t be having this conversation and all the other issues we have to deal with. So I would say the 80, the 80 and nine, we should not take for granted. We should give thanks for the work that was done to build them, and then we should notice what’s going to be required to sustain this.

Jason Calacanis: 52:44 And we almost had a tenth nuclear power in Iran. We did. And we had the latest two, if I’m correct, you’ll correct me because you’re the expert, Pakistan and North Korea. And we had that one doctor, Khan, I believe his name was from Pakistan, who was trying to spread and sell these. Absolutely. Did we make a critical error, we being the West, even the East, humanity, the leadership of letting Pakistan and North Korea into this club?

Graham Allison: 53:08 Well, I mean, not into the club, but allowing them to get nuclear weapons, which is, right. The Israelis have had a different idea. And this goes back to the original attack on Iraq, in Osirak. They call it affirmative non-proliferation. So they say, we’re not allowing nuclear weapons in our neighborhood. And they’ve destroyed the nuclear weapon project in Iraq. They destroyed the nuclear weapon activity in Syria when the North Koreans were building a plant there half a dozen years ago. And now they’ve been the leaders in the destruction of the Iranian nuclear program, which we participated in. I, however, I’m uncomfortable about the wars, even in Iran. I have to cheer for this because I fear additional nuclear weapon states. And I wish that we had managed somehow, let’s say the North Korean case. I’ve even said this to Chinese officials. I said, you know, we and you made a terrible mistake, maybe we made a bigger mistake, to let North Korea get nuclear weapons. But what we should have said to you is, hey, we have an idea.

Graham Allison: 54:34 Nuclear weapons are either good for North Korea and South Korea, or they’re good for neither of them. Your choice. And that would have been hardball, but I think the idea of having Kim Jong-un have now more than a hundred nuclear warheads and missiles that can reach the American homeland is crazy. I mean, here we’re talking about Iran and what it might be. Excuse me, that takes 20 minutes longer from Korea to get to Boston than from Iran, or maybe 25 minutes. So I think that that’s a useful perspective to remind us that we let this thing happen. It’s a ticking bomb as far as I’m concerned. If you asked me what to do about it, it makes me, you know, cry because Trump in the first administration focused on this problem very seriously and did everything that he thought he could. And I thought it was a good effort, even though it was not successful. But the 20 other ways we’ve tried to deal with that problem were all equally unsuccessful.

Jason Calacanis: 55:48 How does China feel about nuclear proliferation and North Korea having these bombs?

Graham Allison: 55:53 Well, I think they feel a little ashamed, at least, about what happened in North Korea and kind of think, well, that wasn’t really our problem. But now, when you say, well, if this keeps, things on the current path, well, maybe South Korea or Japan will have nuclear arsenals in their backyard. They think that’s a terrible idea. And we would be not very enthusiastic about a Venezuelan or Canadian nuclear bomb, yeah.

Jason Calacanis: 56:22 So Dr. Allison, just to kind of wrap our tour of the world here, come back to the United States. Since we last spoke, there have been a number of mayors elected in this country that are self-declared socialists or Democratic Socialists of America, DSA, and there’s a rising populist movement in the United States that seems to be manifesting in many cases candidates that look and act like true deep socialists and want to enact socialist policies. What is the risk to the United States if this continues to go the way it’s going, and what is the risk in the United States do you think in 2028 if we have a Democrat controlled House and Senate and a very populist Democrat candidate that looks like a DSA member, where does this take us?

Graham Allison: 57:12 Well, I’ve just… good for you all for thinking uncomfortable radical questions but real. So if you look at the numbers, I’ve been looking at them lately. They’re hard to believe in terms of the split between wealthy and poor or rich and poor. If you look at who’s benefited for the last generation in terms of the .01%, the 1%, the 10%, the 20%, that’s us and all the people that we know virtually. And therefore when we say the market is, you know, third year in a bull market and my goodness here it’s up 15 or 16 percent or this — 80 or 70 percent of people this is not part of their lives. And when I look at the numbers about both what I think the facts are and then even more people’s perception, it’s just not stable in a democracy if everybody gets a vote and if the top 10 or 20 percent are taking 80 or 70 percent of the pie. That’s not stable and sustainable I think. And it’s a political invitation for a populist and demagogue — I mean you don’t even have to be a demagogue to say that’s not fair, that’s not reasonable.

Graham Allison: 58:46 So I think that it’s not — I mean this is beyond my… I mean I can hardly deal with the problems I focus on. This one is one that I look over my shoulder and think, gee, wait a minute, this first it can’t be true. But then whenever I’ve been looking into the numbers lately they look as bad as they appear. And then this is extremely dangerous and I would say yes. And so I haven’t seen people talking about plausible ways in which, you know, this could be addressed. And I but I think it’s an invitation, you know, for some more radical ideas. And, so while I like very much the trust accounts for kids to give them some stake, I think that’s a fantastic thing. I could probably be persuaded that people even at my level of income should pay another 10% of taxes or whatever for some more adjustment. I think the kind of adjustment that are basically putting people on the dole or support for non-productive or semi-productive activity makes me very uncomfortable unless they’re lame or you know ill or aged.

Jason Calacanis: 1:00:18 You refer to UBI proposals, people getting a universal basic income that takes motivation out of the…

Graham Allison: 1:00:23 Makes me less — I like incentive. I mean I think the stuff of America has been the opportunity for people to be reincentivized to invent create and create wealth that benefits for everybody but if the jam is not getting spread to 70% of the people that’s not a sustainable political situation and I think I mean I thought in the New York campaign we got to see some preview of a bit of this and in the primaries you’re seeing people going into this space. I haven’t seen anybody with a coherent program yet but I think for serious people thinking about what’s good for the country it’s a good one to worry about.

David Friedberg: 1:01:16 Minimum wage, maybe some type of a wealth tax, there are things that people are talking about. We may not all agree with them and they may be hard to execute but one of them is for the people at the top I think you would agree professor Allison the people at the top have the most to lose here and they should be thinking about it and maybe there’s generosity and you know maybe giving away wealth in a more thoughtful way because there’s so much wealth in this top 1% 10% that they can’t possibly spend and so this might be something that that group of people should be thinking a little bit more about. In the State of the Union the Trump called out you know Dell and a couple of other people for having stepped up and say okay I’m you know I’m all in on this. I would say there’s something quite that certainly got my attention and made me think maybe I should be doing something different yeah.

Chamath Palihapitiya: 1:02:10 Well Professor Allison you know they say that you can measure a man’s knowledge and thoughtfulness by his humility. I will say you have extraordinary depth and you’ve thought so deeply about so many of these issues that this world is facing right now and yet you act with such humility and grace when you speak about them.

David Sacks: 1:02:36 I want to thank you for that. I want to thank you for taking the time to be with us today, really appreciate it and look forward to doing it again in person soon.

Jason Calacanis: 1:02:52 Yeah thank you so much on behalf of the audience and just on a personal basis this is such a delight and privilege to be able to do with this with you every year or two and man I hope we can just do it every year because it’s the highlight of my year when we get to talk.

Graham Allison: 1:03:00 But social science, yes. Excuse me it’s an honor for me thank you so much and thank you for what y’all are doing and thanks for thinking of such hard questions. It’ll take me home tonight to think about.

Jason Calacanis: 1:03:01 Yeah. Okay. Thank you, sir. Take care. I’m going all in.