1929 vs 2025: Andrew Ross Sorkin on Crashes, Bubbles & Lessons Learned

Summary

Andrew Ross Sorkin joins Chamath Palihapitiya and David Friedberg to discuss his new book “1929: Inside the Greatest Crash in Wall Street History—and How It Shattered a Nation.” Sorkin explains how he spent eight years researching the crash, discovering previously unpublished transcripts of phone calls between key figures like Thomas Lamont of JP Morgan with Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt. The conversation explores how the 1929 crash was preceded by a credit boom starting in 1919 when General Motors began offering consumer loans, leading to widespread speculation with 10-to-1 margin lending and no SEC regulations.

The discussion draws parallels between the 1920s and today, examining how both eras featured democratization of finance, technological disruption (radio then, AI now), and media amplifying wealth aspiration. Sorkin identifies key characters from 1929: Charlie Mitchell of National City Bank (the Jamie Dimon of his era) who pushed easy credit, and Carter Glass (the Elizabeth Warren of his time) who railed against “Mitchellism.” The conversation reveals surprising backstory about Glass-Steagall, which was less about consumer protection and more about Chase and the Rockefellers lobbying to marginalize JP Morgan.

The hosts debate whether we’re currently in a bubble (monetary, speculative, or otherwise) and discuss how AI is fundamentally driving the economy - with data center spending accounting for significant GDP growth. They explore the political challenge of convincing the public to accept “less” rather than “more” from government, the role of tariffs in national security, and whether America needs a new social compact. Sorkin shares that he’s restricted from investing in individual stocks due to his journalism career, though he wishes he had listened to Chamath’s early Bitcoin recommendations on CNBC.

Highlights

”The Birth of Consumer Credit: General Motors 1919”

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“In 1919, General Motors says, ‘You know what? We’re going to start lending people money so that you can buy a car.’ And that was actually like a major inflection point in America.” — Andrew Ross Sorkin, 4:20

”10-to-1 Margin: That’s How Insane Things Were”

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“You could go into one of these places and you could put a buck down and they would literally loan you $10 off of your dollar. I mean, that’s how insane things were.” — Andrew Ross Sorkin, 4:58

”Glass-Steagall’s Dirty Secret: Lobbying to Destroy JP Morgan”

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“Glass-Steagall almost has nothing to do with breaking the banks apart for political reasons… it actually has to do with business reasons, meaning there was like some major bank money and lobbying going on behind the scenes to f*** over JP Morgan by the guys who were running Chase and the Rockefellers.” — Andrew Ross Sorkin, 21:51

”Chamath Told Sorkin to Buy Bitcoin at $100”

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“I came on CNBC and I would tell Sorkin to buy it at $100 a coin, $200 a coin. Sorkin would show me a clip of Charlie Munger telling me that it was poison… And I said, ‘I have tremendous respect for Charlie and Warren, but they’re wrong.’” — Chamath Palihapitiya, 27:05

”AI Is 100-200 Basis Points of GDP”

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“The GDP quarterly GDP was like flat excluding data center spending… It’s definitely 100 to 200 basis points of GDP.” — Chamath Palihapitiya, 31:06

”Tariffs for Maximum Optionality”

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“Would I be okay with a less better car, but having a national transportation infrastructure that we control and cannot be turned off by somebody else? On the margins, I would say yeah, I’d be okay with that.” — Chamath Palihapitiya, 44:27

Key Points

Credit Revolution of 1919 (4:04) - General Motors started lending people money to buy cars in 1919, marking a major inflection point in American finance that Sears Roebuck and then banks replicated for stocks
10-to-1 Margin Lending (4:58) - Brokerage houses would loan $10 for every $1 deposited, with zero risk underwriting and no SEC regulations
1928 Market Surge (5:31) - The stock market went up 48% in 1928 alone, creating a “when the music’s playing, you’re dancing” mentality
RCA as the Nvidia of 1929 (5:59) - RCA stock (ticker: RADIO) was seen as the world-changing technology everyone wanted to own, similar to AI plays today
Media’s Role in Speculation (10:38) - Time magazine (1923) and Forbes (1917) started putting CEOs on covers like celebrities, shifting how people thought about business
Speculation as Innovation’s Twin (14:52) - Sorkin argues speculation is necessary for innovation - “There is no innovation without some speculation”
Accredited Investor Rules (16:35) - The 1940 act’s accredited investor rule was designed to protect the “little guy” but is now seen by many as keeping them from opportunity
Charlie Mitchell vs Carter Glass (19:40) - The two main characters: Mitchell ran National City Bank and pushed easy credit; Glass railed against “Mitchellism” and eventually authored Glass-Steagall
Glass-Steagall’s Real Origin (21:44) - The famous banking regulation was actually driven by Chase and the Rockefellers lobbying to marginalize JP Morgan, not primarily consumer protection
AI Driving GDP (31:01) - Quarterly GDP was reportedly flat excluding data center spending; AI investment is 100-200 basis points of GDP
Private Equity’s AI Resistance (32:27) - Chamath notes PE firms are the most resistant to AI adoption due to “psychological insecurity” rather than technology decisions
1932 Unemployment at 25% (33:30) - AI’s productivity gains could have similar employment impacts, raising questions about doing more vs cutting costs
Hoover’s Policy Mistakes (36:40) - Hoover raised taxes and passed Smoot-Hawley tariffs; Hoovervilles didn’t appear until 1932
Roosevelt Won on Prohibition (37:17) - Looking at polls, Roosevelt’s victory was driven more by prohibition than economic issues
1950s American Dream as Aberration (38:47) - The “Leave it to Beaver” dream was a post-WWII phenomenon when America was the only industrial power standing
Government Spending Distorts Markets (42:30) - Friedberg argues government promises for education, housing, and healthcare ballooned costs by removing natural market forces
Tariffs and Resource Independence (44:27) - Chamath frames tariffs as preserving “maximum optionality” for geopolitical decisions and avoiding wars over resources

Mentions

Companies

General Motors (4:20) - Started consumer lending in 1919, pioneering credit for car purchases
National City Bank / Citigroup (4:37) - Charlie Mitchell’s bank that became the leading lender to speculators
Sears Roebuck (4:31) - Followed GM’s lead by offering credit for appliances
JP Morgan (6:56) - Thomas Lamont ran JP Morgan; the bank was targeted by Glass-Steagall lobbying
Goldman Sachs (6:56) - Mentioned in comparison to modern banking
RCA (5:59) - “The Nvidia of its time” - the hot technology stock of 1929
Chase Bank (22:08) - Along with Rockefellers, lobbied to pass Glass-Steagall to marginalize JP Morgan
Nvidia (5:59) - Referenced as the modern equivalent of RCA; Nvidia-OpenAI deal mentioned as potentially circular
OpenAI (24:31) - Nvidia-OpenAI deal cited as example of potentially circular AI investments
AMD (24:33) - AMD deal mentioned alongside Nvidia-OpenAI as potentially circular
Coinbase (29:52) - Brian Armstrong cited as crypto OG
Robinhood (29:57) - Vlad Tenev praised for democratizing finance
BlackRock (29:43) - Larry Fink cited as powerful player in traditional finance
Tesla (15:19) - Example of speculation enabling innovation
BYD (44:39) - Chinese automaker cited as threat that would eliminate US car manufacturing without tariffs
Time Magazine (10:41) - Started in 1923, helped make business leaders celebrities
Forbes (10:43) - Started in 1917, part of business media rise

Products & Technologies

Radio (5:54) - The transformative technology of the 1920s, equivalent to AI today
Bitcoin (26:09) - Chamath told Sorkin to buy at $100-200; Sorkin regrets not listening
Artificial Intelligence (5:54) - Compared to radio as transformative technology; driving current GDP growth
Crypto/NFTs (13:53) - Cited as examples of speculation finding regulatory path of least resistance

People

Andrew Ross Sorkin (0:58) - Author of “1929” and “Too Big to Fail,” CNBC anchor
Charlie Mitchell (4:37) - Ran National City Bank, “Sunshine Charlie,” the Jamie Dimon/Michael Milken of his era
Carter Glass (20:27) - Senator who railed against “Mitchellism,” co-authored Glass-Steagall
Thomas Lamont (12:22) - Ran JP Morgan; his secretary kept transcripts of calls with Hoover and Roosevelt
Herbert Hoover (12:38) - President who made policy mistakes including raising taxes and Smoot-Hawley tariffs
Franklin Roosevelt (12:38) - Won partly on prohibition; attacked bankers in inaugural address; implemented New Deal
John Raskob (9:01) - “Elon Musk of his era,” ran GM, built Empire State Building, wrote “Everyone Ought to Be Rich”
Jamie Dimon (19:55) - JP Morgan CEO, cited as modern equivalent of Charlie Mitchell in fame
Larry Fink (29:43) - BlackRock CEO, cited as powerful traditional finance player
Brian Armstrong (29:52) - Coinbase CEO, crypto OG
Vlad Tenev (29:57) - Robinhood CEO, praised for democratizing finance
Sam Altman (30:08) - OpenAI CEO, cited as major actor in today’s market
Elon Musk (9:03) - Compared to John Raskob; example of speculation enabling Tesla
Elizabeth Warren (20:35) - Compared to Carter Glass; loves to cite Glass-Steagall
Michael Milken (19:57) - Comparison for Charlie Mitchell’s credit innovation
Ray Dalio (39:38) - His “end of empire” thesis discussed
Niall Ferguson (39:54) - His view on defense spending as percentage of GDP predicting empire decline (2040)
Charlie Munger (27:09) - Called Bitcoin “poison” on CNBC; Sorkin would show Chamath clips of Munger’s skepticism
Warren Buffett (27:16) - Mentioned alongside Munger as Bitcoin skeptics who were “wrong”
Isaac Asimov (40:28) - His Foundation series and “psychohistory” concept referenced for predicting social cycles

Surprising Quotes

“In 1919, General Motors says, ‘You know what? We’re going to start lending people money so that you can buy a car.’ And that was actually like a major inflection point in America.” — 4:20

“You could go into one of these places and you could put a buck down and they would literally loan you $10 off of your dollar. I mean, that’s how insane things were.” — 4:58

“Glass-Steagall almost has nothing to do with breaking the banks apart for political reasons… it actually has to do with business reasons, meaning there was like some major bank money and lobbying going on behind the scenes to f*** over JP Morgan by the guys who were running Chase and the Rockefellers.” — 21:51

“The GDP quarterly GDP was like flat excluding data center spending… It’s definitely 100 to 200 basis points of GDP.” — 31:06

“I came on CNBC and I would tell Sorkin to buy it at $100 a coin, $200 a coin. Sorkin would show me a clip of Charlie Munger telling me that it was poison… And I said, ‘I have tremendous respect for Charlie and Warren, but they’re wrong.’” — 27:05

Transcript

0:00 Hey, Sorkin. I just went through the comments. The one question keeps coming up over again. Why are you writing this book? Jesus Christ. What a party pooper. What a party pooper. I don’t know, man. I don’t think - I think it’s supposed to be the book’s supposed to be like a beach read. A beach read? Yes. Come on. Did you read it? My god. No. I saw the title. All right, besties. I think that was another epic discussion. People love the interviews. I could hear him talk for hours. Absolutely.

0:58 We’re here with Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chamath and I with another all-in interview, riveting. Today we’re going to talk about Andrew’s new book 1929 and specifically cover why Andrew got into it, what the history teaches us, and are we looking at another 1929 or something different this day and age as a lot of people may speculate. But Andrew, thanks for joining Chamath and I to talk about this.

1:24 Thank you for having me and I love your background there. A true image of what was actually happening in October of 1929, crazily enough. That’s right. And it was colorized by some AI or something, I think. But, yeah. Great. How and why did you get into this era of 1929, the great stock market crash of 1929. Like, you’re a busy guy. You’re on TV every day. We see you all over. You’re at conferences. I saw you at a conference in Southern California this week. Then you’re at another conference and you’re back in New York. You’re very busy. At what point did you say, “Hey, I want to sit down and write a book about this era.”

2:01 Okay, so here’s what happened to me. So, I written that book, Too Big to Fail, about the 2008 financial crisis, right? And people used to always say to me after that, they’d get into these like very in-depth conversations about 1929 or they’d want to know more about 1929. And most people know that something terrible happened in 1929. They know there was a crash in 1929. They oftentimes think it like is the great depression or leads to the great depression. But if you were to ever ask most people now Chamath and you are maybe in a different category and say well who were the people who actually were engaged in this what were they saying to each other who was sleeping with who? Who was trying to screw over who? What was actually happening here and what were the incentives and what were the motivations that led to what clearly were some poor decisions.

2:49 I couldn’t find that. So, I went on a vacation like 10 years ago with my wife, very nerdy, and I like downloaded all these books to my Kindle. And there’s some great books, by the way, about this period, don’t get me wrong, but they didn’t have the sort of character driven story. Like, I loved Den of Thieves. I loved Barbarians of the Gate. I loved stories about people. Fabulous books. Fabulous books. What did your wife think when you ignored her the entire vacation you guys were on were just reading books on your Kindle? I mean, I think she thought I was out of my mind, but no. So, I read these books and I was like, “Okay, where’s the story? Where’s the where are the people?”

3:23 Before you get to the people, can you give people a concise - I was going to ask you for a TikTok of the overarching economic issues before we get to the sort of the characters because I think what to your point which is an important one, people think it was like okay stocks went down, right? But the other things like the overproduction of the economy, tightening interest rates, the war debt, like all of this stuff was just comingled and nobody fully understands that. Can you maybe give folks a precise representation of the setup?

4:04 The setup. Okay. So, let’s just go back even let’s go back to 1919 because actually I think that’s a critical year. So prior to 1919 in America, people did not really borrow money. It was like a moral sin to get credit. Like people didn’t do it. In 1919, General Motors says, “You know what? We’re going to start lending people money so that you can buy a car.” And that was actually like a major inflection point in America because then Sears Roebuck clocks what’s going on and says, “Okay, we’re going to do this too for appliances.” And then a guy named Charlie Mitchell who ran a bank called National City which becomes Citigroup says you know what we can do this for stocks.

4:48 So, you know, and all of a sudden brokerage houses are opening up, you know, on the corners of streets the way we see Starbucks today. It’s like literally like that. And you could go into one of these places and you could put a buck down and they would literally loan you $10 off of your dollar. I mean, that’s how insane things were. And there was no risk underwriting of any kind. Zero risk underwriting. But nobody understood what they were. By the way, there’s no SEC. There’s no regulations. Somebody who read this book early said, “Oh, in your research, did you get a chance to read any of the prospectuses for the companies?” I was like, “Prospectuses? Like if there was like a leaflet that they handed out on the street, you’d be lucky.” So there’s nothing.

5:31 And it’s just like a complete go-go era. Forget about 1929. In 1928, the stock market went up 48%. So, people are just, there’s just sort of like this, it’s a little bit of the Chuck Prince when the music’s playing, you’re dancing, and everybody’s dancing, and nobody’s even thinking about the music stopping kind of like ever. Now, meanwhile, there’s also these technological changes. I mean, huge generational technological changes. In the same way, I think we’re probably talking about like AI today, radio. So RCA was like the Nvidia of its time. Everybody wanted into RCA. The stock ticker was radio because it was like going to change the world.

6:10 And the other big piece of this was also similar to today this idea of democratizing finance. It was like okay the elites have had their way. They’ve made all the money. We’re now going to let everybody in on the action. Now, the difference between then and now though was there was also like crazy amounts of manipulation, insider trading. As I said, there were no rules. Like literally no rules. Nobody’s going to jail for this stuff because it didn’t - there wasn’t a rule against it.

6:37 By the way, it wasn’t just individuals that was investing and overextended with margin. But the banks would take depositors money and they were going long the stock market. The banks were doing it. By the way, not only the banks, regular old corporations. I mean, could you imagine if it turned out that like JP Morgan and Goldman was going long Nvidia with depositor funds? That’s the effective equivalent of what was happening back then, too. You had corporations taking their balance sheet, right, and effectively then loaning it out so that people could go buy stocks. That was the other thing was happening.

7:12 There’s a sort of like just the push towards investing and overproduction and all sorts of other things created this sort of frothy market. And you had a Fed. You mentioned the Fed, which is an interesting part of this. There was a Fed. It was new. Started in 1913. They knew this was a mess. Like they kept saying to themselves, you read all the diaries and notes that I was in for the last eight years. They knew there was a problem. But they were scared out of their mind about doing what they probably should have done, which was raise interest rates, but they couldn’t pull off like a Volcker kind of thing.

7:47 Can you double click into what you said about the fact that there was a social contagion around wealth creation that people felt like the elites had had their way and now it was everybody else’s turn. Just describe that like what had caused that and what amplified that social contagion and who was everyone else? Were these factory workers because we’re kind of on the heels of a big industrial buildout. So like was it the folks who had savings for the first time - like where’s this coming from?

8:15 Well, so what’s really happening is you have a lot of folks who are coming from farms frankly and moving to the big cities for the first time. That’s a huge part of what’s happening. So most of the trading I should say is happening in the big cities. It’s not happening you know out in small towns. It’s happening in big cities for the most part. But that whole sort of scenario once they’re in the big city and they’re seeing that there’s sort of this wealthy group of people, talk about inequality, this wealthy group of people and they want in on the action.

8:47 And also by the way the people at the top, meaning the bankers and investors and entrepreneurs are like, we think there’s this big opportunity to open this up for the little guy or the ordinary investor. We think this is like a huge opportunity. There was a guy named John Raskob who’s sort of like the Elon Musk of his era. He actually ran General Motors, created the credit program there, then becomes hugely wealthy, then gets into politics by the way, ends up building the Empire State Building. But he was trying to create almost like the first mutual fund because he thought that people should be able to get in on the action the way he did. That was like his whole conceit. And he talked about it pretty openly. There was a famous article called “everyone ought to be rich.” That was his line. Everyone ought to be rich.

9:35 And it also was a time where sort of the American dream shifted a little bit, I think, from sort of a Horatio Alger story a little bit to like a lottery, can we get rich? Like the whole idea of capitalism is going to give us this great opportunity? Do you think that radio played a role in that because it amplified these stories and made them go faster and people would just like start to tell these tales and folks started to forget the Horatio Alger part? Like I’m just still trying to understand - you have folks on the farms, right? They’re getting educated. The industrial revolution is happening. So they’re moving to the city and the radio then is maybe what Instagram is like now. You’re seeing people with wealth. You’re seeing this wealth that you don’t have. You aspire to that.

10:20 Yes. And then something comes in and fills the void. Is that kind of the mechanic? I think something fills the void and all of a sudden you now have the opportunity because the bank or the brokerage houses are going to lend you all this money and it’s not just radio being the communication device. It’s really the media. So the other thing that was happening during this period - Time magazine starts in 1923, Forbes 1917. All of a sudden, Charlie Mitchell, the CEOs, are now on the cover of magazines the way Babe Ruth and Charles Lindbergh had been on the cover. So, sort of the shift in how people even thought about business. None of these guys were, you know, famous before the 1920s, but they became famous and everybody wanted to be them.

11:07 This was what America was about was this industrialization, right? And this was kind of like, hey, we’re pioneering an entirely new world and these are the leaders doing it and these are the rock stars that are transforming this country. I mean, was that kind of a big part of what was going on at the time? Totally. And everybody wanted to be a rockstar. By the way, it’s the same way everybody wants to be you David or everybody wants to be Chamath or they all want to be Elon. Like I think there was a huge thing like okay and here’s this opportunity and they were being sold the opportunity and given the opportunity not just to invest but again I think that the margin piece of it was such a crucial crucial element.

11:44 Do you think it’s a coincidence, Andrew, that now you’re publishing this book in 2025, but like how does it feel like eerily similar to you? Like way too similar where you can almost map one to one those boundary conditions then in some version of that today like is that what - like a little bit but not - I will say that wasn’t my intent when I got involved in this. I just wanted to retell the story and figure out who these guys were.

12:12 I ended up after that crazy vacation with my wife. I ended up going to the Baker Library. I happened to be giving a speech at Harvard and I walk in there and I had some time and I asked the librarian. I said, “Can I see these boxes?” This guy Thomas Lamont who ran JP Morgan at the time and I said, “Can I look inside these boxes?” And inside the boxes, his secretary is keeping transcripts of his phone calls with Hoover and Roosevelt. Like, by the way, same way like everybody’s probably talking to Trump today. And I’m like, “Oh my god, I haven’t seen it.” And you’re seeing the conversation. And I thought, “Okay, if you could use those transcripts in an actual story and then you could figure out - I didn’t know if other transcripts existed for all the other characters.” Wow. You could recreate this whole crazy situation, right?

12:56 But I didn’t go into it thinking, okay, this is all one-to-one. And I don’t think it is one-to-one. I think there’s a lot of leverage in the system today, but it’s a different kind of leverage. I like to believe that there’s now an SEC. There’s other regulations. If you believe it, there is one. Paul’s doing a good job. He’s there. So, I’m not here to tell you that like we’re going off a cliff tomorrow. I think there’s probably some things that are happening in our economy today that do mirror that period. And I hope there’s some lessons in here.

13:23 But do you think the regulations that have been put in place over the past hundred years and there have been several cycles, one of which happened after ‘08, of trying to create new protective provisions around how we operate in our financial markets, have they actually changed things enough or does the human element always find its way? It always finds its way to frothiness, to frenzies, to these kind of moments of exuberance, easy money. And this - will there’ll always be a path, you know, whether some people might argue crypto tokens, there was an NFT moment a few years ago. Wherever the regulation kind of path of least resistance is, that’s where everyone goes. Totally. That’s always going to be the case.

14:04 That’s the human condition. We all want more. You know, there’s that great line in Wall Street 2 where I think Michael Douglas says to Shia LaBeouf, I thought the second Wall Street was not as good as the first one, by the way. Says something like, “What’s your number?” and he looks at him and he goes, “More.” Right? And that’s humans. That’s humans. And that’s humans. And more means we’re all trying to figure out how we’re going to get to more. And I think that was what was going on then. To some degree, it’s what’s going on now. I think it’s always going on. It never changes. It’s not like there’s some unique moment today. Maybe there’s technology that’s kind of unlocked this kind of new cycle.

14:44 Look, the other piece of this and it was actually a lesson for me that I still grapple with today. I think people think the word speculation is like a dirty word. And the truth is, having now written this book and Too Big to Fail and just spending, you know, all this time reporting on all this, you need speculation. Speculation is the twin of innovation. Putting your capital at risk. There is no - it’s price discovery. It’s risk discovery. It is the hard underbelly of innovation. I completely agree with - there is no innovation without some speculation. Elon Musk would not have created Tesla unless somebody speculated on him early when it all seemed totally insane.

15:23 No. And also he’s probably speculated himself in 50 different ideas that never saw the light of day. That’s what it means. It’s like you’re investing risk capital. That capital is not always money. A lot of time it’s time and reputation as well. It’s convincing other people to come work on something and you’re doing it speculatively. That’s what Silicon Valley does. Betting on the come. And so then the question becomes, how do you create an environment where you can have speculation? Not just have it, but encourage it, but not let it get out of control, right? Like that is the sort of fundamental question.

15:59 What ends up happening, Andrew, is like no one gives a shit when a big fund manager or a big bank or some kind of dark pool of capital loses money. But when it hits the consumer, when it hits the individual, then there’s this rush to protection. It’s like we need to protect the system. We need to kind of protect the consumer because they’re always the ones that get taken advantage of. Is that kind of fair? And if as you look at what happened coming out of ‘08, look, you can look at both of those things.

16:29 You could look at, by the way, I think an interesting one because we’re now dealing with it now is the accredited investor rule. So, you know, by the way, that really goes back to the late 1930s or 1940. You know, the idea was we only wanted the wealthy to be able to have opportunities to invest in private companies because they were the only ones that we thought should be prepared to lose the money and we didn’t want the little guy to lose the money. Here we are now in 2025 and there’s a lot of folks saying you know I want the access. I want the opportunity.

17:06 And you know sometimes like I remember Chamath you and I probably talked about this years ago. I remember I either talk about like GameStop or some of these other companies and tell people you know oh you got to be careful guys this could go wrong. I said that a little bit about SPAC stuff and some other things and people like Sorkin stop it you’re not protecting me you’re protecting the man. You’re protecting the man and it was sort of regulatory capture. It’s a very interesting concept. So I anyway I haven’t come up with a neat answer about that but I do think about it a lot.

17:37 Well to your point I think the 40s act, 1940 act I think it was, it’s been a very complicated piece of legislation because if you fast forward to today we’re still trying to unwind and fit a square peg into a round hole if you will. The entire crypto economy contorts itself around the ‘40 act, right? All these BDCs contort itself. Private credit contorts itself and why? Well, right now we don’t have the regulatory will to just go and have a wholesale rip and replace of what is really old legislation.

18:15 Well, it was basically written as a way to sort of try to delineate what is a security, what is allowed to be traded, what kind of businesses can be public. And at the time with the understanding that they had of the economy, it all made sense. There was a pretty bright line of here’s a commodity, here’s a security, and here’s what is allowed. The problem is, as we’ve seen, is that businesses today in 2025 are way too dynamic, and they don’t map to the brittle definitions of 80 years ago. The problem is that when you try to go and rewrite those rules, there isn’t the legislative will because what Andrew says comes up over and over again, which is the fear of what could go wrong stops people from doing what I think could go right and that has pretty profound consequences.

19:07 I think in part when you look at what happened in GFC, you can pull the string back to the 1940s and the ‘40 act and people’s reaction to regulations. The savings and loan crisis. That’s another one that was absolutely unnecessary but happened because we tried to contort ourselves to expand the economy in ways that were brittle. Andrew, I want to ask you a question, which is if we go back to ‘29, so we have a good sense of the setup. Yeah. Can you explain the big characters and who they were and the roles that they were playing?

19:40 Okay. So there’s a whole bunch of characters, but I’d say there’s two main characters in this book that really drive the storyline. One is Charlie Mitchell, this fellow who runs National City. He is the Jamie Dimon of his time in terms of fame. He might actually be more like Michael Milken because he really does develop sort of credit for the public. Michael of course did it for businesses later but - he they used to call him Sunshine Charlie and he was on the board of the New York Fed. He was constantly calling for lower interest rates interestingly during all of this and he was the guy who was not just loaning to speculators and stockholders. He was also loaning money to different brokerage houses across the country.

20:27 On the other side of the story in Washington is a guy who you probably heard of or know named Carter Glass. Yeah. Carter Glass was the Elizabeth Warren of his time or maybe even like AOC. AOC. Yeah. And he would, by the way, he was like a racist Elizabeth Warren, interestingly, given the weird things going on down there at the time. Anyway, he would rail for years about this thing that he described as Mitchellism. He believed that Charlie Mitchell and what Charlie Mitchell was doing was going to upend the economy effectively.

21:03 And as the story plays out, they are sort of pitted against each other. One of the things that Charlie does is he defies or at least appears at one point to defy the Federal Reserve, which is trying to clamp down on speculation. They don’t try to raise interest rates. What they weirdly do is they send a letter to all the banks saying, “Please stop lending to speculators.” And the banks don’t know what that even means. So they stop lending basically to everybody. And Charlie says, “We’re not going to have that. So we’re going to start lending ourselves.” And that sort of creates this whole other dynamic which leads him to end up being in front of Congress. And I don’t want to give away the story, but he does get arrested on the steps of his own home for doing some crazy things later in the story.

21:44 But those two sort of play a big role. Then you get to see how Glass-Steagall came about, which by the way is shocking because it is not what you would think at all. It almost has nothing to do - I don’t want to say it has nothing to do with breaking the banks apart for like political reasons, but it actually has to do with business reasons, meaning there was like some major bank money and lobbying going on behind the scenes to f*** over JP Morgan by the guys who were running Chase and the Rockefellers. So, it’s wild. The story is wild.

22:14 Okay. So, just the summary, but Glass-Steagall I think as I understand it, but tell me - basically separates commercial banks and investment banks. Separates commercial banks and investment banks and then sets up the FDIC basically. And sets up the FDIC, right? Again, when you see how that all came together, the FDIC piece of it, the backstory of like these laws. It’s not coming from consumer protection as much as you’re saying lobbying to try to basically marginalize the 800 pound gorilla. Exactly. Exactly. And you’ll see it. You will be in the room with these people literally going in there sitting in the White House begging Roosevelt to do this. And by the way, Carter Glass is actually unhappy about it. I found letters where Carter Glass is like this bill is getting taken away from me and is basically being taken over by the bankers which is almost hilarious because Elizabeth Warren loves to cite this bill as sort of some panacea.

23:11 Andrew as you look at markets today just to come back to the modern era I don’t want to ask you the simple like draw the parallels but are we in - and I’ve heard you ask this question a lot lately - are we in a monetary bubble? Are we in an inflationary bubble? Are we in a speculative bubble? Are we in no bubble?

23:35 So, I’m assuming we’re in some bubble and we just don’t know when it’s going to pop of some sort. And by the way, we don’t know how big it’s going to pop either. It doesn’t have to be 1929. It could be 1999, could be 2008, could be smaller than that. I don’t know. Do I think that there’s leverage? I mean, you guys talk about this AI investment phenomenon that’s taking place right now. And for the most part, the big corporations are spending real cash. So, that’s not leverage. But you look at a lot of the real estate plays, the energy plays that sort of on the periphery of this, there’s a lot of leverage there. I think the private credit world, we don’t really know where all the leverage lies right now.

24:13 Now, I don’t think that any of that is as leveraged as what we were talking about this like 10 to one situation in 1929 or maybe or even like the subprime situation in 2008. But I don’t know, at some point you start to look at some of these, you know, like the Nvidia OpenAI deal or the AMD deal and there is a little bit of a circular kind of thing going on there for now. And I just don’t know where but that could be - we could still be years away from this and by the way it could work out on the other end.

24:45 But what about like government monetary fiscal issues? The central bank monetary policy, interest rates and then the fiscal issue, the government spending right now. Ultimately, if you have a devaluation of the dollar, we’re seeing gold at $4,000 an ounce. We’re seeing the dollar basket trade down. I think one of the worst years we’ve ever seen this year. Does that ultimately translate into a higher index on the stock market because the dollar is worth less? I mean could this actually be more of a monetary or fiscal kind of problem than it is a speculative kind of problem?

25:18 Well so you would think it would be but then explain. So yes I think like the traditional the classic economist would say these things should not be happening at the same time meaning look at the price of equities look at the price of gold look at the price of US treasuries right now. It doesn’t at least classically it shouldn’t line up the way it’s lining up right now. So I just don’t know. I would have thought that the investor class would have wanted to charge us a higher premium for our bonds these days for a whole bunch of reasons, but they don’t. Maybe that’s just like life is relative and other countries are, you know, not doing as well and so we’re still the prettiest girl at the dance.

25:58 I think that’s exactly right. But we’ve never seen so much capital - so much printing happening as we see today. I mean the 7% debt to GDP in peace time with an expanding economy. Never seen that before. Totally. But then if that’s the case, you’d think that we’d all have our money in Bitcoin or gold, but we don’t. Why is that? I don’t know.

26:24 How do you invest? Anyone ever ask you that? Most people don’t ask me that. And the truth is I’m not allowed to invest in individual stocks. It’s actually given what I do for a living. That’s part of the deal part of the nunnery that I have to live in. You’re long the index. I’m long the index. I am long - Bitcoin. Bitcoin gold. I’m long the indexes. And no, I by the way, I wish I could. I thought for many many years, it’s probably shifted now, but for years upon years, I was always - I think Chamath and I have talked about this. I was always worried about buying Bitcoin because I didn’t know - I didn’t want to be on TV or in the papers.

27:02 Oh, I would do it. I came on CNBC and I would tell Sorkin to buy it at $100 a coin, $200 a coin. Sorkin would show me a clip of Charlie Munger telling me that it was poison and he would say, “Chamath, what do you think?” And I said, “I have tremendous respect for Charlie and Warren, but they’re wrong.” I remember those moments fondly and sadly because I should have listened. I should have listened.

27:25 But so, okay, so you have a very balanced kind of portfolio. Pretty vanilla down the middle. Super - I’m not going to get rich on index funds unfortunately on being a journalist that restricts you from access to the markets. I mean you seem to have a good pulse on what’s going on but really what matters in markets is having a pulse on what the actors in the markets are doing, right? And you’re not able to act on it. I have misgivings about it how about that. You’re the character in your show Billions where you have all the inside info but you can’t do anything about it. Can’t do anything about it. Yeah, exactly. But that’s the point. I get it. I knew that’s what I was signing up for, so I’m cool with it.

28:04 I mean, do you like being a journalist? I mean, do you like sitting as a speculator or an observer versus being an actor? I mean, have you ever thought like, man, I really understand markets. I really understand the parallels to history. I’ve got a good sense of this. I feel like I should play a role. I want to play a role. I can make money. I think about that. I’ve thought about that for years, totally, about, you know, could I be an actor? Could I play a role? And I often go back to the idea and look, maybe this is not the right way to think about it, but I feel like I’ve managed to have hopefully some semblance of credibility with some people by doing it this way. And I’ve been able to be hopefully a good part of the conversation and be engaged in a lot of things. Maybe I could do that as a direct actor, too. I don’t know. I also think, by the way, journalism seems to be changing. MSM, legacy media. I mean, by the way, there’s a lot of people - or you could start a podcast and you could just do whatever you want to do. So, I don’t know. I don’t know what the right answer is.

29:03 Tell us who are the characters in the play today. Who are the actors? Who are the main actors that you see in - That’s a good question. Yeah. The main actors, well, I think you’d probably think about them in a couple different ways. You sort of think about on the financial side and probably the tech side and where they sort of come together. So, I think obviously and then the government piece. So obviously the president, Scott Bessent on the sort of business end of things inside the government. And then I think in the banking or classic banking world, you’d say that probably Jamie Dimon and Larry Fink are probably the most powerful players in the sort of traditional legacy piece, but then you’d probably give a nod to Brian Armstrong at Coinbase as sort of being one of the OGs in sort of wherever you think crypto goes.

29:57 By the way, I’d probably hats off to Vlad Tenev who I think’s been sort of very outspoken sort of talk about democratizing finance, right? Like he sort of represents that. But then you tell me I mean I think Sam Altman and Elon and wherever you think AI is headed next and the Google guys. But it’s interesting because you’re saying that technology particularly AI is playing a key role. Yes. Fundamentally. It seems like it is. Do you think that’s true? Well, I’m asking because you also - I mean the capital that’s moving through banks. There’s a whole another set of industries that generate trillions of dollars of revenue that seem to be largely ignored in the conversation about where the global economy is, where it’s headed, where markets are headed. It’s all about AI, right? I mean, and I think that’s like -

30:41 But that’s because and I guess the question is like is that a media thing or is that like a real economy thing? I think it’s a real economy thing because I think if you X out the Mag 7, all of a sudden the economy does not look nearly the same. I mean I don’t want to say we’re levitating but you know we’re either - I saw a data point yesterday that said the GDP quarterly GDP was like flat excluding data center spending. Does that sound right to you? Did you see that? It’s definitely 100 to 200 basis points of GDP. Yeah. So sure. So let’s say if you X out the AI boom where do you really stand? I think that’s a real real life question.

31:22 I think the reason why no one’s focused on the rest of the economy first of all the AI story I think is the more exciting part but it is what I think is - I don’t want to say propping up the economy but it’s keeping the economy - well I would flip it on its ear. I don’t - I think that those comparisons are kind of dumb because at every point in the economy there are these dynamic reallocation of resources and assets. Things are important at different times. I think the thing with the AI thing is like what is every company doing to figure out what they look like in a world of AI and if they’re not going to spend that amount of time, their productivity is probably going to on the margin shrink to a net new company that just does what they do just efficiently and better. That’s just the cycle of creative destruction we’ve seen at every point of every meaningful technology.

32:08 So you think we need to be talking about this much more outside of the sort of like tech and data centers and I made this - Yeah, I made this comment. All the private equity wives got their husbands to come in and rail at me in the comments and I said, you know, the least success I’ve had at this software company I started has been selling into private equity. It’s like I have Fortune 500 and Fortune 1000 customers lining out the door. I couldn’t sell to one single private equity company what is effectively a platform that uses AI to rewrite all your software. And I’m like, but this is the first company that should be in line.

32:45 And what it goes to is that their heads are firmly in the sand. And I think that’s not a decision on technology. It’s a psychological decision. So I think the weird thing with AI is that it pushes people to a place of psychological insecurity. And I think that they think I don’t want this to be my problem. I need to just wait this out and somebody else will deal with it in the future. That’s very different than other technology arcs like in the dot bubble. That’s not what we lived through. In the social bubble or the mobile bubble it was always like okay this seems interesting. Let’s figure out how to embrace it take advantage of it. This is the one where many people are like nope I’m just nope.

33:26 All right but here’s the question. So, you know, 1932 comes around and we had unemployment in this country at 25%. 25%. Yeah. It was pretty crazy. Yeah. If the AI boom is as successful as I think we’re all excited it could be and it affects every industry in every way and all the things we’re discussing here, there need to be massive productivity gains. Like massive, like crazy. And invariably, productivity gains are sort of a euphemism for cutting costs in some other way. And that ultimately probably is going to have an impact on employment in this country - or do more things. And the question is which one is it? Or by the way, is it a combination of both? I would probably - it’s a combo.

34:08 You hire people so that they spend less time doing drudgery and you allow them to work on more important things. Like I’ll give you an example. My wife runs a life sciences business and what’s funny is when she looks at AI, she’s like, “All of this stuff is trying to sell me speed.” And she’s like, “I don’t want speed. I want quality.” She’s like, “I’m not trying to make 500 molecules tomorrow. I’m trying to make the right molecule for the right disease, and I’m happy to take five or six years to do it.” And right now I think we’re still in the novelty slopware phase of AI where most of it is about speed and you know you’re spending a lot of money to try to get crappy outcomes out faster.

34:54 Eventually we’ll replace that with quality outcomes and they’ll take a lot more time and I think that’s when you’ll have the real productivity improvements. Back to life sciences like these guys want to get drugs for every person, right? That’s not a tomorrow thing. That’s not like type it in English and all of a sudden pops out the other end. And so I think we’re going to have to take a lot more time. That’s when this stuff becomes really real and that’s going to be very exciting.

35:18 Andrew, did we see coming out of the crash of 1929 a big move towards socialism in this country saying, “Hey, capitalism has failed us.” And you know, how do you kind of speak to the rise of socialism today and the argument that capitalism’s failed most Americans? Well, so yes - and to add on to that, do you think the New Deal would have looked the same or would there have even been a New Deal if there hadn’t been a crash?

35:46 Okay, so two quick answers. Yes, that conversation happened, but not nearly as quickly as it happened, for example, after GFC of 2008. So I remember being down at like Zuccotti Park, Wall Street, Occupy Wall Street, all of this conversation we’re having now about socialism versus capitalism. Like that happened immediately. In 1929, that conversation did not happen immediately. Part of the reason it didn’t happen is because there was sort of like a slow roll on the economy and even the market. So there was sort of a disconnect between the economy and the market. People forget at the end of ‘29 the stock market actually was down only 17% by the end and so people thought it was actually going to come back. There were times when it actually seemed to be coming back.

36:31 And Hoover had this idea that he could - it was almost like a psychological problem and that the market and the economy were detached from each other. He then starts making all of these sort of frankly mistakes. Obviously the Fed doesn’t flood the system. Hoover decides he wants to raise taxes. He does Smoot-Hawley with tariffs. That’s something he had pledged to do to try to get farmers to actually vote for him. And he thought that was like a pledge that he had to keep. And so there’s a whole sort of set of policies that came into play. And the Hoovervilles don’t show up in these sort of like tented camps, sort of think Zuccotti Park. That doesn’t happen really till 1932.

37:09 And when you go back and look at why Roosevelt won, it wasn’t actually on the economy. If you go and look at the polls, it was over prohibition crazily enough. And so it didn’t have that sort of social effect. Having said that, you know, famously Roosevelt, you know, on his inauguration day goes after the bankers in the inaugural address. And then, of course, the New Deal shuts down the banks, has what was equivalent of national holiday. 9,000 banks go out of business, right? And then that’s sort of when the conversation about capitalism and socialism starts to rear its head.

37:45 I think it’s because at that point in American history, we had not yet made the promise to the average American that they have the right or the opportunity to buy a home, to get a college education, to have progressive income every year. As you point out, most folks were transitioning from an agrarian to an industrial economy. And so the big transition in life had been, “Wow, I can get an apartment. I don’t have to work 12 hours a day grueling physical labor in the fields. I can actually live and walk to a grocery store and get amazing food and meet people and socialize and live in this amazing city.”

38:18 And it was before we had made all of these promises that I think led to these expectations that folks then end up feeling disappointed by and they blame it all on the failure of capitalism. My personal opinion as you know is that it’s fundamentally a function of overspending by the government and overpromising rather than allowing natural market forces to bring everyone up which fundamentally I think created and creates a lot of the distrust and the issues we face.

38:43 Can I just add on top of that because you know you’re describing what I always think of as sort of the Leave it to Beaver American dream that people sort of have in their mind which is really more of like a 1950s style dream and actually was a function I think of a post-World War situation where the country was - we were monopoly power, everybody else was out of business. This is also the time like the reason why unions even worked I would argue for in large part was because there was this period of time where we were the only players in town and so we could charge monopoly rents for a lot of things and people could buy a house with a white fence and have two kids and have an education - all of those things that we now say are the dream. I’m look - there’s some people who think that was an aberration in history. I hope it wasn’t, but I’m saying there were a lot of forces at play that created that dream, but I don’t think that was the dream in 1929.

39:38 Yeah. Do you buy into Ray Dalio’s points of view that we’re at the end of an empire, end of a cycle? I hope we’re not. I hope we’re not. You look - I think you look at a lot of the things going on right now just with how much debt we have. I sort of look at the Niall Ferguson view of the world which maybe lines up pretty directly with Dalio which is that when you get GDP - you start to look at like defense spending as a percentage of GDP, there is this point at which at least historically you have like a real problem and that sort of has created the end of the empire. I think that happens in his view of the world in like 2040 so maybe there’s still time to turn it around. I don’t know what you - What about you?

40:25 It’s a very exact forecast - 2040. You ever read that - what’s that series, the Asimov series on where they’ve got this like social forecasting capability? Sorry, totally forgot. Sorkin, do you think that if you look at GDP going through the crash, it basically cratered and then - I mean whatever we think of the New Deal, I think the reality is that it just created an enormous amount of investment that then just turned GDP around. Is there a version of the New Deal that America needs to do today? Is there a new compact we need to have with our citizenry today?

40:58 Well, but so there’s two things that happened though. There’s the New Deal and then World War II. I mean, so yeah, I think you have to sort of lump them in a way together in terms of the spending profile and why we were spending and - well, even I think in the mid-30s though, really before we were engulfed in it, we were cranking like 8-10% GDP. My point is just more - just that idea of a new social compact, a new set of agreements. I don’t know like is we at a point - maybe maybe we do but what does that look like and where are we going to get the money to spend it? That’s the real question and how can we -

41:39 I think Freeberg would say - well I’m not going to put words in Freeberg’s mouth - is that the agreement is actually not about spending more but actually less and getting folks to understand that these trade-offs need to happen. So I agree with you and I agree with David on that like I think we have to cut spending in a big way but this goes back to the more issue which everybody wants more.

42:01 The irony Sorkin and I’ve shared this point of view many many times but I think when we made the promise - when the federal government and people who got elected to represent the population and the federal government got elected, they said we’re going to give you an education and then we’re going to use federal spending to do that. We’re going to give you access to a home. We’re going to create this federal home loan program. And in all these cases when there was a promise made on giving you the more, it was all about increasing government spending. We’re going to give you access to healthcare.

42:30 And then Medicare became kind of this ballooning spending line because in every case because it’s not actually a free market, the government doing the spending gets taken advantage of and all the costs underlying that spending line get inflated because there’s no natural market force of buy and sell. There’s only a market force of buy. And that’s why education costs have ballooned. That’s why housing has ballooned. That’s why medical expenses, pharmaceutical drugs have all ballooned. Because as soon as the government provides that as a service, it completely distorts the market and you can never get out of that freefall.

43:00 So the fundamental challenge is you have to have the more difficult conversation to your point of it’s not more, it’s less and we’re all going to have to kind of deal with that or you’re going to do the same thing that everyone’s done historically which is wealth taxes and growth slow - all the stuff that we’ve seen many times before. So, but this is now you’re talking about like a political - it’s almost a paradox or a challenge which is how do you get the public to buy into the idea of less, right? That is the fundamental question. We all know that we have to spend less.

43:32 I agree with that. And by the way, I feel blessed that I could probably afford it - to take less. But the question is, you know, if you don’t have it, taking less - Yeah. They’ll say, “Yeah, rich guys like you can say that. Good for you.” Like that’s not fair to me. And I think that’s the big issue is the people who would proclaim that would be immediately attacked like you live with less, tax the rich and that becomes where Dalio and others have argued historically. You see these notions of civil unrest of civic splits that happen.

44:05 By the way, the book is Foundation, the Foundation series. I don’t know why it didn’t come to my mind. The idea is called psychohistory where the guy can actually predict all of these social trends because they’re all predictable and they all happen in cycles.

44:14 Okay. Can I just throw one other thing in this because I’m so curious about it and I spent a lot of time thinking about Smoot-Hawley in terms of tariffs. So there’s a fair argument that tariffs are now tying to national security resilience today and like we may decide philosophically you want to have an automobile industry in the United States because if you let BYD sell cars in this country we would not sell cars in this country and we wouldn’t make cars in this country ever again. And you may think that that’s a bad idea and you want that to be here.

44:49 Having said that, if we do this, which we are, we will probably spend more to buy less technologically capable cars 10 years from now than the next time we all, you know, if you go on vacation to Europe or Asia and get in the back of one of these other cars. And how should we think about that? That to me is like a real fundamental question about capitalism and also about resilience and national security.

45:14 What I would offer to you is the way that we should think about this is how do Americans and American society preserve maximum optionality in the face of very difficult decisions in the future. So if geopolitically we are induced into a war, all wars have tremendously bad consequences. How would we have the wherewithal to not have to be a part of it? If you look at the last number of wars, these are all ultimately over resources. Right.

45:47 And if you think about resource independence, there are many, many things today where America is just fundamentally unstable because we don’t have resource independence. But if we were to get that and then we had the building blocks, we wouldn’t actually have to fight a war. Now, there may be other reasons and people may pull us into wars and I get all of that, but I think that’s a really big question. Would I be okay with a less better car, but having a national transportation infrastructure that we control and cannot be turned off by somebody else? On the margins, I would say yeah, I’d be okay with that.

46:21 And the interesting part though is there’s going to be a premium on that, right? Like we’re going to pay more for that. And that may be - that may just be the cost of doing business. Sure. And that may be the cost of strategic flexibility and optionality. And I think if you just think about what the downstream consequences of not having that are - and maybe and by the way maybe those costs are even higher and those costs don’t get added into the model. Right. You’re absolutely right. They’re always higher because they’re measured in human lives. It’s always higher. It’s always more costly.

46:53 Andrew, who do you sell the movie rights to of your book and when’s the movie coming out? Haven’t sold them yet. We’re talking to a couple people. Hopefully, we’ll have some news on that sometime soon because it sounds like it’s a very people-driven story. So, it should make for kind of great drama, right? Oh, totally. I mean, I tried to write it - I didn’t try to write it for film per se, but I tried to write it in as cinematic a way as humanly possible given that I was also constrained by, you know, I had to have archives and notes and diaries. You know, it looks like a long book. By the way, folks, it’s a little bit shorter because there’s a hundred some odd pages of endnotes at the end for those who want to - and by the way, some of the endnotes are kind of fun.

47:35 Andrew, when you write these things, do you - and then when you license it, for example, like when they started to make Billions? Yeah. Do you take a strong point of view and how the scripts in that case or the screenplay in this case will be written or do you kind of say, “Okay, here’s my source material. You guys do the best you can” and you kind of - do you care who the actors are. Do you care about any of that stuff or do you think it’s like, okay, they’re licensing it, off on your merry way. Do the best you can?

48:01 You know, I think actually in this day and age just - because it’s probably in your mind, right? You have a vision of what this whole thing looks like visually. You probably have faces, right? You probably have all of this. So, how do you let go of that or - Well, I think first of all, I think you have to let go a little bit at some level because that’s just the nature of the business for better or worse. I think right now in this streaming environment, you know, there’s sort of two ways you can go sell projects like this. One is you go sell it to a streamer and they go off and they try to develop it. They go find the team that does it. The other approach is, you know, find the actor, maybe a director, maybe the writer all at one time and then walk in with it. So in that context, you probably have more of a say in the future of it.

48:44 You know, right now just the way the business is, you know, Hollywood’s buying a lot less stuff and I think is more interested in sort of the former version where you show up with the whole thing sort of prepackaged, pre-planned, but you know, it almost changes by the month in terms of what they want.

49:04 Are you doing the audio book yourself? Were you reading the - I read it. You guys are in the audio business yourselves. So I will tell you I went in - it’s 13 hours the book in total. You do it on double time and you’ll be done in six and a half hours. But it probably took me like 30 hours. It takes a while and they do it. I did do it. Yeah. I did it. It was fun. It was like - your first time. Was it your first time reading the audio book? I’ve never read it before. When Too Big to Fail came out, we had a British actor do it and I enjoyed - I enjoyed listening to him. He added some gravitas to the project because the Brits always sound smarter than us. British. Pretty much. Pretty much. Okay. Sounds smarter. Sounds smarter. I was going for sounder than us. They do. They do.

49:55 Well, Andrew, thanks for joining us. This has been awesome. Congrats on the release of your book. Thanks for chatting. Good broad range of topics. I’m buying it. I’m buying it. Yeah, I appreciate guys. You know, I enjoy this so much and I listen to you guys so religiously. So, this is a - You’re the best, bro. Thanks for doing it. I mean, it’s an incredible period of American history that, to your point, not enough people really understand. I’m glad you - I find it so interesting. That 20 year period, I would say ‘28 to ‘48. Well, thank you. Wow. It’s got everything. Thank you guys. I appreciate it. All right. We’ll talk soon. Thanks, man. I’m going all in.